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THE ABCHERS AT CBECY.
THE important question about Crecy is not what Froissari meant
by a herse, but what tactics could have enabled Edward III to win
his great victory. The word at a later date became a technical
term, .meaning a body of archers drawn up in a way that can be
sufficiently discerned. Froissart, however, uses it merely by way of
comparison, to describe something new, and the later use is not con-
clusive as to his meaning. We are on much firmer ground if we
start from the known facts, and see what inferences can be deduced
from them.
1. It is quite certain that Edward III dismounted his men-at-
arms, in order to stand on the defensive: against great odds it was
his best chance, and horsemen obviously cannot stand to await at-
tack. 2. It is equally certain that the enormous losses of the French
were inflicted by the archers, the effective range of whose weapon
may be taken at 400 yards, though doubtless arrows could be sent
further. 3. The charging French reached the dismounted men-at-
arms, and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. 4. Archers could
not shoot properly if formed in solid bodies, large or small: those
in rear could not see the enemy, and would run some risk of hitting
their comrades. Hence the archers must have been drawn up in
something like a line, either close together and at most three deep, or
at wider intervals and perhaps eight deep, which latter was the forma-
tion of a later date, and probably of Crecy also. 5. The English loss
was extremely small: there is no trace of the archers having
suffered heavily, as they would have done if ridden down by the
French knights. Moreover had they once been really defeated the
battle would have taken a totally different turn: it is implied in
every narrative that the archers continued effective to the last.
The only formation, so far as I can see, which answers to all
these conditions is as follows: the dismounted men-at-arms drawn up
in line to withstand the enemy's charge, having a line of archers on
each flank, with their front thrown forward at an angle to the front
of the men-at-arms.1 In this position the archers could obviously
shoot into the charging enemy from the moment they came within
range until they retired out of range again, a very alight change
of each man's attitude sufficing to change the direction of his
shooting.
Combination of different arms is the basis of successful tactics,
and this combination was both novel and successful. It cannot be
doubted that it was suggested to Edward HE by the experience
of the -Scottish wars—by FalMrk, where the Scottish clumps of
spears, impervious to the men-at-arms, were broken by the archers
1
 This formation is that indicated by Biker of Swinbrook, whose words are quoted
and discussed below.
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and then cut to pieces by the horsemen; and by Bannockburn,
where the English knights charged in vain on Bmce's line of
spearmen, and the archers ranged behind the knights were helpless
to retrieve the disaster. Kohler* indeed asserts that Edward HE
had thonght it out long before Crecy, and adopted it as his perma-
nent system; but his only reference is very far from precise, and I
confess the statement seems to me impossible. The merit of the
plan consists in enabling a very inferior force to stand on the defen-
sive with a good prospect of beating off the enemy; but it is not
suited for the offensive, and no one begins an aggressive campaign
with the deliberate expectation of being always completely out-
numbered. But however this may be, Edward III surprised the
French with it at Crecy; his son used it under slightly different
conditions at Poitiers with even greater success. Henry V had such
trust in its efficacy, which he had himself augmented by causing the
archers to carry stakes to be fixed before them as a protection, that
he could move in this formation, instead of standing in a carefully
chosen position: arriving within bowshot, he could force his enemy
to attack or give way altogether, and again his victory was over-
whelming.
The essential value of this combination depends on the archers
being able to sweep the front of the spearmen. Hence it is neces-
sary to calculate how far, with the numbers engaged at Crecy, the
archers would have been able to do this. The numbers actually
engaged are not known with accuracy; even the different manu-
scripts of Froissart do not agree. But they ore known, assuming
that credence can be given to any statements at all, within moderate
limits. Edward III took with him 4,000 men-at-arms, 10,000
archers, and some thousands of other infantry, chiefly Irish and
Welsh. He had had some fighting, but not on a large scale; he
could have had no reinforcements, and we hear of no sickness.
Hence his numbers at Crecy were less, but not very greatly less,
than those he landed with. All accounts represent the prince of
Wales's ' battle' as having been the largest of the three. Hence
he had from 1,200 to 1,600 dismounted men-at-arms and 8,000 to
4,000 archers. Northampton and Arnndel had in the second
' battle' perhaps two-thirds of these numbers.
We have no certain knowledge of the depth of the formation of
the dismounted men-at-arms at Crecy. At Agincourt we are ex-
pressly told that they were drawn up four deep, and since the
numbers on that occasion were very small relatively to the enemy—
so small that not a man could be spared for a reserve—we may
reasonably assume that no thinner line was deemed possible. On
the other hand the spears of the hinder ranks in a deeper formation
would have been hardly of any use. The space to be covered at
* EntwicMmgdtt Krugruxun* vtdtr Bitteruit,VLS6i.
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Crecy was also considerable, which would furnish a strong motive
against unnecessary depth. Hence there is a fair presumption, though
no more, that they were four deep. They would naturally stand,
or sit, or kneel, as close together as was consistent with bringing
all the spear points to the front, which would require about a yard
for each man in the front rank. If so, the prince's front was from
800 to 400 yards long.
We do not know the formation of the archers with the precision
of a modern drill book, but Sir John Smythe's* description, given
in 1590, when hertt had come to bear a technical meaning, is suffi-
ciently distinct.
The ancient order [he says] was into hearses—that is, broad in front
and narrow in flanck, as, for example, if there were 25, 80, 85, or more
or fewer archers in front, the flancks did consist but of seven or eight
ranckes at the most. AnH the reason was this: that if they had placed
anie more i-mi"!"*1 than seven or eight, the hinder ranckes of archers
should havo lost a great deaie of ground in the volees of their arrowes at
their nn^m" ,^ <y»nfp7iariTtg the convenient and proportional distances
between rancke and rancke, and the ranckes before them, as also that
the sight of the hinder ranckes should have been taken away by so many
former ranckes from directing their volees of arrowes towards the enemies'
faces.
It is obvious from this that the archers stood some distance
apart, like modern skirmishers, the men in the hinder ranks not
being exactly behind those in front; this agrees with the vague indi-
cations of old prints, and is what we should expect a priori. Sir
John Smythe does not say exactly how far apart the archers stood ;
and if he did it would prove little about Crecy, nearly two and a
half centuries before, when the formation was tried for the first
time. But in order that their hinder ranks should see the enemy
at all, the men in the front rank cannot well have been less than
two yards apart. On this calculation the prince's archers at
Crecy would have formed a line of about 400 yards in length on
each flank. If this was placed at an angle of 45 degrees to the
men-at-arms, the distance from the outer end of one archer
line to the outer end of the other would have been from 800 to
1,000 yards. That is to say, a small portion only of the charging
enemy would have been out of effective range, and these would
have come within it as they approached nearer. Assuming this
formation for the 'Rngiiqh, it is easy to see that a very large pro-
portion of the French would be liable to be struck down by arrows,
but that the portion in the centre would be likely to run the
gauntlet successfully, at least so far as to reach the English men-
at-arms, though even these would be exposed incessantly to the
archers nearest to the flanks of the men-at-arms. If it be asked
• Diteouru concerning Ik* Force and Efftei o/diurt Sorts qf Wtapmt, p. CO.
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why the French should have charged on the men-at-arms at the
bottom of the opening, instead of at the archers on the flanks, two
reasons may be given—the notorious difficulty of getting horses
directly to face arrow flights, and the equally notorious class pride
of the French nobles, who deemed the plebeian archers unworthy
of their steel.
The position at Crecy, so far as it can be identified, seems to have
been about a mile long. It must have been fully occupied, what-
ever it was—that is to say, the flanks must have been covered in
some way—for Edward had had ample time to choose it, and he
was certainly a fairly competent tactician. That the French did
not in the first assault attempt to turn it proves nothing, for they
came on in a reckless, tumultuous fashion, obeying no general
orders and expecting easy victory. But it is scarcely conceivable
that attack after attack should have been made straight on the
English front, if it was equally open to them to turn it. Now the
prince's ' battle,' if drawn up on the above theory, would have
covered something over half a mile. If the second ' battle,' drawn
up in the same fashion, adjoined it on the left, as seems to be
indicated by the authorities, the two would, on the above calcula-
tion, fairly occupy the space from the little river Maye, flowing
through Crecy, to the village of Wadicourt, which is the only
position that is pointed out by competent judgment as answering
to the other known conditions. I assume that each ' battle' was
separately drawn up in this fashion, so that if two were placed in
line with each other the archers of the inner flanks would meet at
the apex of a more or less rectangular wedge. In no other way
could the whole front be even approximately covered by the archery,
and it is certainly in accordance with medieval practice to treat each
' battle' aa a separate organic unit. When, as at Agincourt, the
• battles ' were small, the front would be still more effectually swept
by the arrows. It is at least possible that the enormous slaughter
on that occasion was partially due to the smallness of king Henry's
• battles.'
I have already put forward this theory, though in a more sum-
mary way, in my ' Battles of English History.' It rests on the
known facts, but it does not controvert anything in the authorities.
Froissart's phrase ou funs it lair hataille would be really more
appropriate to the men-at-arms thus placed than to their suggested
position as a second line in rear of the archers. And his words
about the French knights on one occasion breaking through the
archers may perfectly well mean that they succeeded in getting
through their 'zone of fire' (to use a very modern phrase); it can-
not mean that they rode over and defeated them. This view is
also in accordance with the interpretation of the word herse most
consonant to its later technical use, which would make it descrip-
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tive of the actual formation of the archers, not of their position
relatively to the men-at-arms. More important still, it is in full
accord with the only precise tactical statement made by any of the
authorities, that of Baker of Swinbrook:4 Sagittariis eeiam sua loea
designantnt, ut, non coram armatis, sed a lateribut regis exereitus quasi
aloe mtarent, et sic non impedirent armaios neque inbnicis occurrerent
infrontc, sed in latcra sagittas fubninarent. That this is a delibe-
rate statement is obvious on the face of the words ; and confirma-
tion is found in the fact that Baker, writing of Bannockburn,
attributes the defeat in part to the uselessness of the archers
there—non habentium dtttinatum locum aptian, set prim armatorum
a tergo stancium qui nuric a latere solent constare.1 I admit that
my last point, the archers being thrown forward at an angle,
is not actually stated by Baker, but it is perfectly consistent
with bis words, and seems to me essential to the effectiveness of
the whole. "Writing as he did before the treaty of Bretigny, he is
the most thoroughly contemporary of all our authorities; and no
one can read the military parts of his chronicle without being struck
by the unusual precision of the language. He, or his informant, had
paid intelligent attention to the tactics of the long bow, and would
deserve respect even if he made improbable statements. In the
case of Crecy his account of the formation adopted is far from being
improbable; it is the only one, as I have attempted to show, which
agrees with the known facts.
"With regard to the word herte or herce, it is quite possible that
there are really two words, one derived from hirpcx, and meaning a
harrow or a stand of candles, the other derived from ericius, and
meaning some kind of checal de /rise or other military obstacle.
What Froissart had in his mind we cannot possibly know, but the
form of his phrase, d manniere d"une liene, implies that he was
using the word by way of illustration and comparison, not as a
technical term; and it may be meant to apply either to the
formation of the archers themselves or to their relation to the
men-at-arms. In the former sense it became a technical term,
which is, so far as it goes, an argument in favour of this having
been the meaning of Froissart, who, so far as can be traced, is the
originator of the phrase. And the simile of a harrow is an apt one
for a body of men drawn up as Sir John Smythe describes. Frois-
sart' s use of the same phrase at Poitiers, where certainly the
archers were on the flanks of Salisbury's men-at-arms, tells also
against his having meant a cheval defrise at Crecy. It is possible
too, though rather forced, to regard the harrow as a simile for the
outline of the whole front, the alternating pointed wedges of archers
and straight lines of men-at-arms. By Sir John Smythe's time a
4
 Chromcon Galfridi It Baktr dt Swymbrok* (e& E. M. Thompson), p. M.
» Ibid. p. 16.
47 Vol. 10
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738 THE ARCHERS AT CRECY Oct
herse of archers had become, as we have seen, a body of 200 to 300
men, drawn ap in the manner described, and forming a recognised
tactical unit. ' Oar ancestours,' he says,6 • placed their hearses of
archers either before the front of their armed footmen, or ella in
wings upon the corners of their battailes, and somefcymes both in
front and wings.' But this is no reason for asserting that at Crecy
in particular the archers were placed in front, or even that they
were divided into specific bodies. Unless Baker is entirely wrong,
they were placed on the wings. But it is quite easy to see how
convenience might lead to their being divided then or later into com-
panies, for which Froissart's simile offered an apt title. And it is
easy also to understand how, as experience showed more and more
dearly the extraordinary power of the archers, they may have been
placed in small bodies in front of the men-at-arms, perhaps ready
to retire through their line, or to position on the flanks, whenever
a charge was pressed home. HEBEFOBD B. GEOEGK.
A SUTEENTH-CENTUBY SCHOOL.
THE manuscript given below is written on two blank leaves at the
end of a book in the Bodleian Library. The volume into which it is
bound (D. 7.4. Line.) consists of a number of early sixteenth-century
books, most of them from the press of Albert Paffraet at Deventer,
the latest bearing date 1516. The particular book which contains
this manuscript is the ' Farrago' (s. L et a. 4°) of Alexander Hegius,
the famous rector of the school at Deventer, who died in December
1498. The same handwriting is found throughout the volume in
marginal notes and glosses, which are written at great length and
display a laborious erudition. Fabsographically it has been assigned
to the first half of the sixteenth century; and on other grounds it
is probably not much later than the date of the bound volume,
since in the early days of printing books soon became rare, and
were regarded as treasures too sacred to be written on before they
had been many years issued from the press.
In this manuscript are contained the rules of a school, pre-
scribing the duties of pupils and teachers alike. The calligraphy is
faulty and in places illegible, and the Latinity is debased, many
words being used with such extended senses that some portions of
the code cannot be interpreted except by free conjecture. The
comparison of the fines imposed is extremely difficult, owing to the
confusion of monetary systems then prevailing in Europe. A stufer,
or stiver, seems to be the largest coin mentioned. It is the price
imposed for the graver offences—for producing a knife in a quarrel,
and refusing to pay fines; and for breaking the copy of the rules,
* Discount*, 4 c p. 61.
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